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REVISITING USER CONTROL: THE
EMERGENCE AND SUCCESS OF A FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY FOR THE
INTERNET AGE
JOHN B. MORRIS, JR. & CYNTHIA M. WONG*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, when the popular, commercial Internet was just
emerging, concerns about protecting children online were already
on legislative agendas, and no one knew exactly what level of First
Amendment protection courts would afford this new form of mass
communication. That year, two public policy advocates, Jerry
Berman and Daniel Weitzner, argued in the Yale Law Journal that
the Internet's technical characteristics, including abundance of
capacity and a high level of individual user control, meant that
online speech should receive the highest level of protection under
the First Amendment-protection comparable to print.'
In the years since then, the concept of user control-or
"user empowerment" 
-has been central to numerous decisions
protecting speech in the online environment, from the United
States Supreme Court on down.' Under this theory, if technology
* The authors are, respectively, General Counsel and Ron Plesser Fellow of
the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), a non-profit public interest
organization that works to keep the Internet open, innovative, and free. The
authors of the 1995 Yale Law Journal article discussed in this essay, Jerry
Berman and Daniel Weitzner, were co-founders and initial leaders of CDT.
Berman continues as Chair of CDT's Board of Directors.
1. Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of
Interactive Media, 104 YALE L. J. 1619, 1626-29 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 668-69 (2004)
(holding that filtering software was a less restrictive method of protecting
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can provide users (and parents) with the ability to control what they
(and their children) access online, government regulation of
content would be unconstitutional. Arguments against and
criticisms of this constitutional theory have been advanced,3 but the
idea that users and parents-and not the government-should
control what children access online remains the dominant rationale
for courts to protect speech online. This essay looks at the origins
and application of the "user control" theory in the online context
and how the theory has fared the test of time. We conclude that
"user control" on the Internet is as vital and important today as it
was when Berman and Weitzner first advanced the theory fifteen
years ago.
children from indecent material and that the government failed to prove the
software was so deficient as to indicate otherwise); Reno v. ACLU (CDA),
521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (finding there were less restrictive means than
content-based restrictions to protect children from indecent material, such as
parental control filters); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008)
(same), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009); ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp.
2d 775, 794-97 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing the effectiveness of filtering
software as a less restrictive method of protecting children from indecent
material), affd sub nom. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008);
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preferring filtering
software to the more restrictive provisions of the Child Online Protection
Act), affd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), affd and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
3. For example, in defending the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),
the government argued that user control tools (i.e., filtering software) are not
an available effective alternative because such tools are not perfectly effective
in that they both over- and under-block; not all parents use filtering tools; such
tools can be circumvented; and such tools are already part of the "status quo"
that Congress found ineffective at protecting minors. Brief for Appellant at
43-56, ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-2539). See also
Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. at 669-70 (rejecting the government's
argument that filtering software was less effective); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d at 203-204 (same). We discuss criticisms of the user control theory in
more depth in Part IV, infra.
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I.THE "USER CONTROL" THEORY IN THE ONLINE
CONTEXT
The First Amendment protects against overreaching by the
government to censor or control content. A key concept
underlying this protection has been that the listener-the "user"-
should choose what content is worth the listener's time.4 As the
Supreme Court has explained, "[a]t the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence."5  Under the First Amendment,
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid"6 and are
subject to strict scrutiny:
[A] content-based speech restriction . . . can
stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. If a
statute regulates speech based on its content, it
must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest. If a less
restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use
that alternative. To do otherwise would be to
restrict speech without an adequate
justification, a course the First Amendment
does not permit.
Thus, under the First Amendment, the government is not free to
substitute itself for listeners and decide what they should be able to
hear.
4. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The
constitutional right to free expression.., is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity ... ").
5. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
6. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted).
7. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(citations omitted).
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But in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,8 the Supreme Court
considered how the First Amendment would apply in the broadcast
context. In that case, a plurality of the Court relied on the flip-side
of this approach to uphold a governmental content regulation,
based on its conclusion that listeners lacked control over what
content they would receive. 9 In Pacifica, the plurality held that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could prohibit the
radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue. The plurality was concerned that, given the nature of
the broadcast medium of content delivery, content would "assault"
a listener (or viewer) in his or her home. 1° It concluded that
broadcast content had a "uniquely pervasive presence" that came
into a person's home, and over which the person had no control.11
Because of this asserted lack of control, the Court did not apply
"strict scrutiny," and decided that the government could step in and
regulate content in this narrow context.
12
It was into this legal landscape-with the broadcast
medium, because of its particular characteristics, receiving less First
Amendment protection than the print medium-that the popular
Internet emerged. And it was this landscape that Berman and
Weitzner confronted in their 1995 essay, "Abundance and User
Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment
in the Age of Interactive Media."' 3
In 1995, it was far from clear what First Amendment
standards would apply to the emerging online environment. It was
also equally unclear exactly what form the online world would
8. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9. Id. at 748-50. In a narrowly-drawn holding, a plurality of the Court
upheld FCC sanctions against a broadcaster for airing indecent material
because the listener could not be adequately protected from unexpected
program content due to the "pervasive" nature of broadcast and because the
broadcast medium was "uniquely accessible to children." Id.
10. See id. at 748-49.
11. See id. at 749-50. In his dissent in Pacifica, Justice Brennan argued
that the viewer indeed had control over access to content-the on/off switch-
but that was not sufficient for the Court. See id. at 765 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
12. Id. at 748-50 (majority opinion).
13. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 1.
ultimately take. America Online (AOL) was rising as the leading
path for consumers into the online environment, but it was only
taking hesitant steps to allow its users to step outside of its "walled
garden" of content to access the Internet directly. Other online
services-such as CompuServe and Prodigy-competed with AOL,
and pure Internet access (as is common today) was still used mainly
by academics and more technically advanced users."
In their article, Berman and Weitzner pursued two
simultaneous goals: first, to urge courts (and policymakers) to
bestow the highest level of First Amendment protection on the new
media, and second, and of equal importance, to urge the architects
of the new media to build into new media technical characteristics
that would make it deserving of that full constitutional protection.
As the authors noted, they were offering "a First Amendment wish
list for the age of interactive media." 5
Berman and Weitzner focused their arguments on two
critical factors-abundance and user control:
In order for interactive media to develop with
the diversity-enhancing characteristics of a
medium such as print-and to win strong First
Amendment protections from regulation like
those accorded to print-their architecture
must have two key characteristics. First, the
architecture must be open and decentralized,
promoting a true abundance of information
and communication opportunities. Second,
there must be sufficient user control to enable
users to choose what information they want to
receive, and what they want to keep out, thus
eliminating the rationale for government to
14. Indeed, in their article, Berman and Weitzner seldom used the term
"Internet," focusing instead on broader terms "interactive media" and "new
media." See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 1, at 1619 n.1. This distinction
becomes all the more important today as digital content is increasingly
available across a wide array of interactive platforms and devices, a
development with which both policymakers and the market for user control
tools must contend.
15. Id. at 1635.
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step in and protect various parts of society with
intrusive content regulations.
1 6
Their first point-that the new media must be open,
decentralized, and abundant-remains a critical concern today, and
those goals lie at the heart of ongoing battles about "network
neutrality" and the risk that access providers will act as bottlenecks
and gatekeepers over users' online choices. A loss of openness or
neutrality would pose serious challenges to free speech online, 7 but
to date, these factors have not been a significant focus of courts in
analyzing First Amendment claims in the online context.
In contrast, Berman and Weitzner's second focus-user
control-has been a central issue in many of the leading First
Amendment cases about the Internet. Laying the groundwork for
those cases, they argued that "[i]nteractive media differ from mass
media in that they offer users a great degree of control over the
content that users and their children receive,"' 18 and they describe a
range of emerging filtering and other technologies that could
provide robust user controls.' 9 As Berman and Weitzner explain:
User-control technologies enable customers (in
particular, parents) to limit access to certain
kinds of material on their .. .PCs. With such
control mechanisms within the practical reach
of parents, the goal of indecency regulations-
the protection of children-could be achieved
without intrusive government restrictions. In
interactive media, the reasoning of Pacifica...
would not justify content regulation at all,
whether it is regulation of sexual expression,
16. Id. at 1621.
17. See generally John B. Morris, Jr. & Jerry Berman, The Broadband
Internet: The End of the Equal Voice?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY: CHALLENGING THE
ASSuMPTIONS 119 (2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/
broadbandinternet.pdf (discussing free speech risks posed by a loss of open
and neutral access).
18. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 1, at 1629.
19. Id. at 1632-34.
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violence, commercial speech, or other
controversial materials.2 °
Berman and Weitzner were concerned, though, that
''political pressures [would] threaten to introduce draconian
regulations into these new media before user-control mechanisms
have a chance to take hold.",2' They were particularly concerned
about the "Exon Amendment" (named after its lead sponsor,
Senator James Exon), which ultimately passed as the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) and was signed into
law early in that year.22 The CDA and the resulting legal challenges
to it would prove to be the first significant test of the user control
theory in the online context.
II.USER CONTROL IN THE COURTS
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was signed into
law in January 1996 and was challenged immediately in a suit filed
in Philadelphia by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 3
Congress, anticipating that the CDA would draw a constitutional
challenge, had provided that a three-judge district court panel
would hear the case, with direct review by the Supreme Court.24
The CDA criminalized the dissemination of "indecent"
material in a way that rendered such material "available" to
minors. 2' But, because speakers on the Internet had no way to
screen out minors, and thus all content was "available" to them, the
practical effect of the CDA would have been to reduce online
content to a level appropriate for a child.
As Berman and Weitzner had anticipated, the need to
determine what First Amendment standard should be applied to
the Internet arose immediately in the CDA case-in the very first
20. Id. at 1634.
21. Id.
22. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505,
110 Stat. 133, 142 (1996).
23. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
25. Id.
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filing made by the U.S. Department of Justice to defend the law.26
Opposing a motion for a temporary restraining order against
enforcement of the CDA, the Department of Justice argued that
the case presented "compelling parallels" to the FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation decision, which applied a lower level of constitutional
protection to the broadcast medium.27 The government argued that
the Internet was pervasive and readily available to children (as the
Supreme Court had noted about broadcast in Pacifica).2 s In later
briefing, the government reiterated its Pacifica argument:
The approach Congress enacted [in the CDA]
is constitutional under Pacifica. Like broadcast
stations, the Internet is establishing an
increasingly "pervasive presence" in the lives of
Americans.... Like indecency presented on
broadcast stations, indecent material presented
over the Internet "confronts the citizen in the
privacy of the home." Like broadcast stations,
the Internet "is uniquely accessible to
children.,
29
The district court granted the ACLU's motion for a
temporary restraining order against enforcement of the CDA.30
Soon thereafter, a second lawsuit was filed in the same court
challenging the CDA, and both cases were consolidated for trial. A
key purpose of the second suit was to emphasize the user control
arguments against the CDA-and against the application of
Pacifica to the Internet.3
26. See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-
963), available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/EFFACLU-vDoJ/960214-
doj-opposition.brief.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Brief for the Appellants, Reno v. ACLU (CDA), 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(No. 96-511), 1997 WL 32931 (citation omitted).
30. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838-42 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction at 72, American Library Association v. U.S. Dep't
116 [Vol. 8
REVISITING USER CONTROL
In the course of that lawsuit, the three-judge district court
panel received extensive evidence of user control tools and
capabilities, including both parental empowerment options built
into leading online services such as AOL, and stand-alone software
programs such as "CYBERsitter" and "Net Nanny."32 In striking
down the CDA as unconstitutional, the court included extensive
findings of fact concerning such user empowerment tools and
concluded: "Despite its limitations, currently available user-based
software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which
parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit
and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for
their children will soon be widely available."33
One judge explained: "As we learned at the hearing,
parents can install blocking software on their home computers, or
they can subscribe to commercial online services that provide
parental controls. It is quite clear that powerful market forces are
at work to expand parental options to deal with these legitimate
concerns."
34
In upholding the judgment that the CDA was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the
significance of "user-based" tools that allow parents to control
of Justice, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-963), available at
http://w2.eff.org/legal/cases/EFFACLU_v_DoJ/ala_030196_injunction.brief
(emphasizing "user-based tools that empower parents to control their
children's online activities based on the parents' views of what is appropriate
for their children").
Berman and Weitzner, early proponents of the "user control" approach,
were also instrumental organizers of the second lawsuit, which was filed on
behalf of the American Library Association, America Online, and many other
leading online companies and organizations. Berman and Weitzner's group,
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), coordinated the second suit
and retained Jenner & Block LLP to represent the plaintiffs. One of this
article's authors, John Morris-then at Jenner & Block-served with his
partners, Bruce Ennis and Ann Kappler, as lead counsel in the case.
32. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838-42 (detailing extensive evidence of
user control technology).
33. Id. at 842.
34. Id. at 883.
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access to content.35 Although the Court did not focus much
attention on user control technology, it did squarely reject the
Pacifica "lack of control" rationale for governmental regulations.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that the "factors [found
in Pacifica] are not present in cyberspace," and specifically that
"the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or television. The district
court specifically found that '[c]ommunications over the Internet do
not "'invade"' an individual's home or appear on one's computer
screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by
accident."' 36
In two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has more
directly confronted and squarely validated the user control theory.
First in a case involving cable television regulation, and then in a
legal challenge to the "son of CDA," the Child Online Protection
Act (COPA),37 the Court has made plain that promoting user- and
parental-empowerment technology is a constitutionally "less
restrictive alternative" to government regulation of content.
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. , the
statute required a cable company to block access by all households
to lawful sexual content during certain hours of the day in an effort
to protect children. The crucial fact in the case was that wholly
independent from (and as an alternative to) the system-wide
prohibition challenged in the case, parents could direct the cable
company to block the entire channel, just for their individual house.
The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the mandated
blocking requirement because individual parents had the means (a
"less restrictive alternative") to protect their children without any
burden on the rights of willing adults to access the sexual content.
The Court reasoned that "even where speech is indecent and enters
the home, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to
support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a
35. See Reno v. ACLU (CDA), 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (citation
omitted).
36. Id. at 868-69 (citation omitted).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
38. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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less restrictive alternative."39 The Playboy Court made clear that if
there exists a targeted capability for parents and individual users to
control access to content, government regulation to control the
content more broadly cannot stand:
Simply put, targeted blocking is less restrictive
than banning, and the Government cannot ban
speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and
effective means of furthering its compelling
interests. This is not to say that the absence of
an effective blocking mechanism will in all
cases suffice to support a law restricting the
speech in question; but if a less restrictive
means is available for the Government to
achieve its goals, the Government must use it.
40
Four years later, the Supreme Court returned to the topic of
user control-this time squarely in the Internet context-and in a
five-Justice majority decision, emphatically endorsed the promotion
of filtering software as a constitutionally less restrictive alternative
to government content regulation. In Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA ),4
the Court reviewed and upheld a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of COPA, which was Congress's mild revision to the
CDA following the Reno v. ACLU decision (striking down the
CDA).
In the COPA majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justices Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Souter, specifically agreed
that user-based filtering software was a less restrictive alternative to
content regulation:
The primary alternative considered by the
District Court was blocking and filtering
software. Blocking and filtering software is an
alternative that is less restrictive than COPA,
and, in addition, likely more effective as a
means of restricting children's access to
materials harmful to them....
39. Id. at 814.
40. Id. at 815.
41. 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They
impose selective restrictions on speech at the
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the
source. Under a filtering regime, adults
without children may gain access to speech they
have a right to see without having to identify
themselves or provide their credit card
information. Even adults with children may
obtain access to the same speech on the same
terms simply by turning off the filter on their
home computers. Above all, promoting the use
of filters does not condemn as criminal any
category of speech, and so the potential chilling
effect is eliminated, or at least much
diminished.42
The Court upheld the preliminary injunction but sent the case back
to the district court to bring the evidentiary record on the
effectiveness of filters up to date.
As we discuss in greater detail in the next section, the
district court answered the Court's question of whether filtering
tools have become more effective and available in the intervening
years with a resounding "yes., 43  On remand, the lower court
permanently enjoined COPA, holding that the law would not be
effective at protecting children and that the government had failed
to show that filtering technology is not a less restrictive alternative
to advance the government's goal. 44 Importantly, the district court
issued a broad affirmation of the user control approach after an
extensive review of the diversity, availability, cost, ease of use, and
effectiveness of filtering technologies. 4 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's conclusions and, in January
42. Id. at 666-67.
43. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 793-94 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
44. Id. In fact, the district court concluded that although filters are not
perfect, evidence shows they are "at least as effective, and in fact, are more
effective than COPA in furthering Congress' stated goal for a variety of
reasons." Id. at 815.
45. Id. at 789-95.
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2009, the Supreme Court declined to hear the government's
appeal-bringing to an end this ten-year stage of the battle over
how best to protect children online.46
Taken together, these cases directly validate the user
control approach advanced by Berman and Weitzner to protect
children online without sacrificing First Amendment principles.
From the Supreme Court down, these courts have affirmed the
notion that if end users are empowered to choose what speech they
wish to access or block online, then such a user-controlled approach
is fundamentally less restrictive than universal restrictions imposed
at the source. Since COPA was passed, four major online safety
task forces and commissions in the United States have reached the
same conclusion, deciding that education and voluntary technology
tools are the most effective way to protect kids online.47 In the next
section, we will examine how effective and ubiquitous user control
technologies have become.
III.USER CONTROL AS DEPLOYED IN THE MARKET
As the Supreme Court noted in COPA's second appearance
before the Court, the Internet and other interactive media
46. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1032 (2009).
47. See INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, ENHANCING CHILD
SAFETY & ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/isttf/; COPA COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (Oct. 20, 2000), available at
www.copacommission.org/report; POINTSMART.CLICKSAFE TASK FORCE,
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST PRACTICES FOR CHILD ONLINE
SAFETY (July 2009), available at http://www.pointsmartreport.org/;
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD OF THE NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE INTERNET (Dick
Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., Nat'l Academies Press, 2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/youth-internet/. For a summary of the findings in
all four reports, see Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Found., Five
Online Safety Task Forces Agree: Education, Empowerment & Self-Regulation
are the Answer, PROGRESS ON POINT, July 2009, http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/2009/pop16.13-five-online-safety-task-forces-agree.pdf.
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technologies develop and transform at unprecedented speeds.4a
The CDA and COPA cases illustrate the practical challenges of
using static laws to attempt to control a rapidly changing
environment.
In contrast, the market for user empowerment tools has
flourished alongside new media developments as parents and
caregivers seek sensible strategies to protect children in an
increasingly networked world.49 Reviewing COPA on the merits at
the direction of the Supreme Court, the district court's extensive
findings of fact documented many of these advancements. Both the
district court and Third Circuit on appeal relied heavily on these
findings in concluding that user empowerment tools are both more
effective and far less restrictive than COPA in advancing
Congress's interest.50
Filtering software and other tools have become increasingly
sophisticated, allowing parents to tailor a variety of options to suit
the values and needs of each particular household. The district
court found that many filtering software tools are highly
customizable by "enabling parents to choose which categories of
speech they want to be blocked... and which age setting they want
the product to apply."51 Many tools also enable parents with
multiple children to set up different accounts for each child,
allowing parents to adjust settings according to age and maturity. 52
The filters themselves can be further fine-tuned to the household's
48. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004).
49. See, e.g., ADAM THIERER, THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND.,
PARENTAL CONTROLS & ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION (Summer 2009),
www.pff.org/parentalcontrols (surveying available online tools and methods of
filtering online content).
50. See Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 198-204 (quoting the district court's
findings of fact extensively).
51. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 791 (E.D. Pa. 2007). For
example, parents can specifically block or allow access to content based on
categories such as sexually explicit material, illicit drug information,
information on violence and weapons, and hate speech. Id. See also
GetNetWise, Tools for Families: Filtering and Blocking,
http://kids.getnetwise.org/tools/filters (providing a searchable database of
filters that allow blocking by category of speech).
52. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
[Vol. 8
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values by allowing parents to create customized "black" or "white"
lists of websites the parents would like the filter to block or allow
(respectively), notwithstanding the other categories that they have
preset.53
In addition, many user empowerment tools aid parents in
enforcing a variety of house rules that go beyond simply what
content their children should be able to access. To help enforce
computer usage rules, "[s]ome filters can also restrict Internet
access based on time of day, day of week, how long the computer
has been connected to the Internet, or which user is logged onto a
computer. ' ,5 4 Other tools can block use of Internet applications or
protocols other than HTTP (either in whole or only for certain
uses), including e-mail, instant messaging, chat, peer-to-peer file
sharing, streaming video and audio, Internet television, and voice
over Internet protocol (VoIP)."
For example, a parent can configure a filtering tool to block
a child's use of chat rooms completely or simply filter out
inappropriate words within a chat session. Many tools also allow
parents to block transmission of certain sensitive information to
strangers, including address and credit card information, over a
variety of applications." Finally, many tools now enable parents to
monitor children's Internet activities, either remotely in real time,
or by providing a report after the fact.57
The district court also assessed the availability and cost of
filters. Because of robust competition in this market, the court
found user control tools to be affordable and widely available.58
Many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and at least one major
operating system offer filters and other parental control tools to
customers for free.: In addition, the court found that filtering
programs are "fairly easy to install, configure, and use and require
53. Id. at 790.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., GetNetWise, supra note 51.
57. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id.
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only minimal effort by the end user to configure and update." 60
Surveys suggest a very high level of user satisfaction with available
software.6'
Finally, as the Supreme Court requested on remand, the
district court examined the effectiveness of filtering tools and found
that available tools are remarkably effective for their purpose-and
for Congress's goal of preventing minors from accessing sexually
explicit material on the Internet-blocking around ninety-five
percent of sexually explicit material on the Internet.62 In assessing
whether user filtering is at least as effective as COPA, both the
district court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals contrasted this
ninety-five percent blocking rate with evidence showing that COPA
would not even address availability of substantial amounts of
sexually explicit material on the Internet since around fifty-five
percent (and growing) of such sites are hosted abroad.63
As Berman and Weitzner suggested, with such a diversity of
effective and feasible user control mechanisms within practical
reach of parents, the goal of protecting children from pornography
and other potentially harmful material on the Internet and other
interactive media can be achieved without heavy-handed
government restrictions. The courts have unmistakably affirmed
this notion: When faced with a choice between a one-size-fits-all
speech restriction and a specific user-controlled technological
solution available for parents to use, courts have made clear that a
blanket speech restriction cannot survive strict scrutiny absent a
showing that the technological solution is not as effective.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 794.
62. Id. at 795; ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 201 (3d Cir. 2008). The
COPA district court found that these tools had improved quickly due to a
robust competitive market and technological advances. Gonzales, 478 F.
Supp. 2d at 794-97.
63. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 789, 815; Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 202-03.
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IV.CRITIQUES OF THE USER CONTROL THEORY
The user empowerment jurisprudence is not without its
critics-most significantly Justice Breyer and a minority of the
Supreme Court. These critics have raised a number of challenges to
the idea that filtering and user empowerment software should be
considered a less restrictive alternative to governmental regulation.
The critiques do not, however, undercut the strength of user
empowerment tools, either as important components of any effort
to protect minors online, or as constitutional alternatives to more
burdensome government action.
A. User Empowerment Tools are Not Perfectly Effective
A key criticism is that filtering software is not perfect. As
Justice Breyer notes- accurately- "filtering is faulty, allowing
some pornographic material to pass through without hindrance. ' 4
The COPA district court found that filtering software blocks access
to as much as ninety-five percent of sexual content online-but that
means that five percent or more of such content is not blocked.65
The applicable standard, however, is not perfection, or even
near-perfection. To be a constitutionally less-restrictive alternative,
something must simply be as or more effective than the government
action that is being challenged. As the Supreme Court explained in
ACLU v. Reno, a restriction on speech is "unacceptable if less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. 66 In
COPA, the district court concluded that filtering tools clearly met
this standard because the statute would be ineffective in thwarting
overseas websites (and thus would be much less effective than
filters).67
64. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 685 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
65. See Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 795.
66. Reno v. ACLU (CDA), 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
67. See Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 789, 815; see also COPA, 542 U.S. at
667 ("COPA does not prevent minors from having access to .. .foreign
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B. Not All Parents Use Filtering and Control Tools
In defending COPA, the government argued repeatedly
that filtering and control tools are not effective because not all
parents use them. Justice Breyer agreed, noting that "filtering
software depends upon parents willing to decide where their
children will surf the Web and [being] able to enforce that decision.
As to millions of American families, that is not a reasonable
possibility., 68 He also noted that not all families can afford filtering
software, even if they wanted to use such tools. 69 According to this
argument, user control tools would be ineffective at protecting, for
example, minors left at home without supervision or those who
have unfiltered Internet access on computers outside the home. 0
Determining how to raise children is a quintessentially
parental responsibility, including how and when to restrict access to
sexually explicit material. Many parents recognize that it is
impractical and unrealistic to try to monitor all media consumption
of their children (especially older minors) at all times. This
practical reality is perhaps one reason why the most recent studies
of online child safety place an increasing emphasis on the role of
digital media literacy and education as a vital component of any
71strategy to protect minors online.
Importantly, recent surveys demonstrate that parental
guidance and other non-technological approaches also play a
72
critical role in protecting minors online. Most parents take an
harmful materials. That alone makes it possible that filtering software might
be more effective in serving Congress' goals.").
6& COPA, 542 U.S. at 685.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 685-86.
71. See INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, supra note 47;
POINTSMART.CLICKSAFE TASK FORCE, supra note 47.
72. See, e.g., THIERER, supra note 49, at 25-44 (describing the many non-
technological methods parents use to protect children from harmful material);
AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, TEENS, PRIVACY AND ONLINE SOCIAL
NETWORKS v-vi (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2007/
Teens-Privacy-and-Online-Social-Networks.aspx (summarizing the non-
technical means by which parents monitor children's use of the internet and
other media).
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active role in guiding their children's Internet experience through a
variety of methods that may not involve technological tools,
including setting house rules for Internet and mobile device usage,
monitoring such usage, placing computers in common rooms, and
educating their children to make informed media choices.73 In fact,
a recent Pew Internet & American Life Project study found that at
least eighty-five percent of American parents use technological user
control tools, non-technological approaches, or some combination
of the two.
74
In affirming the user control approach, courts have
explicitly acknowledged the variety of parental preferences and
approaches to protecting minors online. In enjoining COPA, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited studies showing that "the
primary reason that parents do not use filters is that they think they
are unnecessary because they trust their children and do not see a
need to block content., 75 The Supreme Court has recognized in
two separate cases that if some parents do not block adult content,
it does not necessarily follow that they do not know how to do so
or, alternatively, that promoting the use of blocking technology
would not be an effective alternative to a blanket speech
76
restriction. Indeed, in endorsing the user control approach, these
courts have affirmed that families-not the government-should
choose for themselves what content should be accessed in the
home, consistent with fundamental First Amendment values.
73. See THIERER, supra note 49, at 25-44.
74. LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 72.
75. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 203 (3d Cir. 2008).
76. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000)
("A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be
ineffective; and a court should not presume parents, given full information,
will fail to act."); Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004)
("COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor what
their children see. By enacting programs to promote use of filtering software,
Congress could give parents that ability without subjecting protected speech to
severe penalties.").
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C. Parental Use of Empowerment Tools Is Not a Governmental
Action
Another key criticism argues that mere use of filtering and
control tools is not really a governmental act, and thus cannot be
considered an alternative legislative approach under strict scrutiny
analysis, much less a "less restrictive alternative." In his dissenting
opinion in COPA, Justice Breyer characterized the problem
Congress sought to address as protecting children exposed to
harmful material, despite the availability of filtering software.77 For
Justice Breyer, the presence of user control tools was merely part of
the backdrop against which Congress enacted COPA. Congress
may not require that parents use filters, the argument goes, and so
parental use of such tools is not a governmental act-and "'doing
nothing' does not address the problem Congress sought to
address., 7 1
But, as the Supreme Court stated clearly in Playboy, the
existence of "targeted blocking enables the Government to support
parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests
of speakers and willing listeners., 79 The courts and online safety
task forces have identified many concrete ways in which
governments may act to protect minors online.8 °
Congress can, for example, promote parental use and
awareness of such tools. As the COPA district court concluded,
"the government may promote and support their use by, for
example, providing further education and training programs to
parents and caregivers."8' One recent blue ribbon task force
recommended expanding online safety education programs to
empower parents and teachers to prepare minors to navigate the
77. COPA, 542 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
80. See COPA, 542 U.S. at 669-70 ("Congress undoubtedly may act to
encourage use of filters .... By enacting programs to promote use of filtering
software, Congress could give parents [the ability to monitor use] without
subjecting protected speech to severe penalties.") (internal citations omitted).
81. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 814 (2007).
Internet and other new media.82  The same task force
recommended increased government funding for professional
development for teachers, curriculum development and
implementation for students, public awareness campaigns, and
research to identify and promote best practices for digital literacy
and online safety.
83
To address cost concerns, Congress could act by "giving
incentives or mandates to [ISPs] to provide filters to their
subscribers, directing the developers of computer operating systems
to provide filters and parental controls as a part of their products,
[and by] subsidizing the purchase of filters for those who cannot
afford them." Congress could also subsidize the use of filters on
computers accessible to minors in schools and libraries.85 Finally,
Congress could take steps to promote the development and ease of
use of tools by performing further studies and developing
recommendations and best practices to improve these tools.
As courts have recognized, all of these options are
governmental acts that represent less restrictive alternatives to a
one-size-fits-all restriction on online speech. That filtering
technology is something that parents must implement-if they
decide they want to filter-does not diminish the fact that the
promotion of user empowerment can be a less restrictive
alternative to government regulation.
82. POINTSMART.CLICKSAFE TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 7.
83. Id. at 7-8.
84. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
85. Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in
2000, which strongly incentivizes use of Internet filters in libraries and schools
by conditioning certain federal funding on their use. Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
1(a)(4), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6777, 9134 (2003); 47
U.S.C. § 254 (2003)). While CIPA was ultimately upheld by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003), this
approach raises a number of First Amendment concerns: filters can be a
useful-though imperfect-tool when used voluntarily by parents;
government-mandated filters, however, would result in the blocking of lawful
websites and otherwise constitutionally protected speech, for both adults and
minors.
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D. Filtering Represents the Status Quo on Which Congress Can
Legislate
Ultimately, Justice Breyer's most fundamental objection in
the COPA case to user empowerment being a less restrictive
alternative is his assertion that filtering software is "part of the
status quo ... against which Congress enacted [COPA].,,8 6 Justice
Breyer essentially asserts that Congress might have passed COPA
based on a theory that filtering tools were not good enough. There
are a number of flaws with Justice Breyer's analysis, including the
lack of significant evidence that Congress was focused on the
effectiveness of filtering software when it passed COPA in 1998.
More critically, Justice Breyer's COPA analysis is
inconsistent with how the "less restrictive alternative" analysis has
been implemented under the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. In one seminal case, Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC,8 7 the Court overturned a law prohibiting
"dial-a-porn" by holding some prior FCC regulations were a less
restrictive alternative to the newly passed law. 8 Indeed, the new
law repealed statutory provisions on which the prior regulations
were based8 9  In other words, the "less restrictive alternative"
found by the Sable Court was precisely the "status quo" that existed
prior to the passage by Congress of the law held to be
unconstitutional.
The facts in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc.,9 further illustrate the difficulty raised by Justice Breyer's
"status quo" analysis. In that case, one section of an act (§ 505) was
held to be unconstitutional because another section of the same act
(§ 504) was found to be a "less restrictive alternative."91  But
hypothetically, had § 504 been passed a brief time before § 505,
86. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 684 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
87. 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989).
88. Id. at 128-29.
89. Id. at 122-23.
90. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
91. Id. at 823.
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Justice Breyer would presumably argue that § 504 was the "status
quo" on which Congress passed § 505 (and thus § 504 could not be a
less restrictive alternative). Yet that would upend the constitutional
analysis based solely on the timing of the Congressional
enactment-thus upholding (using Justice Breyer's analysis) a
speech-burdening provision when a less burdensome and more
effective alternative was readily available.
Moreover, Justice Breyer's overriding focus in 2004 on what
the "status quo" was when Congress enacted COPA in 1998 would
seem to preclude any later development of a less restrictive
alternative. Whatever the state of filtering software was when
Congress enacted COPA in 1998, if by 2004 filtering was both
constitutionally less restrictive and more effective than COPA, the
statute should not have stood. And the COPA majority appears to
have reached this same conclusion, remanding the case for further
factfinding by the trial court. As the Supreme Court noted:
[T]he factual record does not reflect current
technological reality-a serious flaw in any case
involving the Internet. The technology of the
Internet evolves at a rapid pace. Yet the
factfindings of the District Court were entered
in February 1999, over five years ago. Since
then, certain facts about the Internet are known
to have changed. It is reasonable to assume that
other technological developments important to
the First Amendment analysis have also
occurred during that time. More and better
filtering alternatives may exist than when the
District Court entered its findings.
9 2
Contrary to Justice Breyer's focus on the "status quo" in
1998, the majority appropriately placed the focus of the First
Amendment analysis on the present day. As the COPA district
court found on remand, user empowerment technology has proven
to be a far more effective-and less constitutionally burdensome-
92. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA), 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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alternative to heavy-handed governmental regulation.93  After
thirteen years of litigation-starting in 1996 with the Reno v. ACLU
challenge to the CDA, up to the Supreme Court's 2009 denial of a
third appeal of the COPA challenge-the courts have well
established that user controls are the constitutionally best approach
to address concerns about minors' access to online content.
V.USER CONTROLS IN THE WEB 2.0 AGE
The Internet has not, however, stood still during the
thirteen years of CDA and COPA litigation. On the contrary, we
have seen a dramatic explosion of innovation in "user-generated"
content on sites such as YouTube and Wikipedia and interactive
communications on blogs and social networks such as Facebook.
These "Web 2.0" sites have transformed how users relate to online
content and to each other over the Internet and have become a (if
not the) dominant way that young people connect with each other.
Much of the success of Web 2.0 platforms is due to a
provision of the U.S. Code that was enacted at the same time as the
Communications Decency Act in 1996. With what is known simply
as "Section 230," Congress acted to foster innovation and growth in
the online environment. 94 To this end, § 230 provides immunity to
93. Another way to analyze the First Amendment issue today is that the
wide availability of free or low-cost user empowerment tools, and the high
level of effectiveness of such tools, see supra Section III, call the governmental
interest into question. These tools, plus the fact that many parents do not
consider it to be necessary to block sexually explicit material because they
prefer to educate their children about media consumption (and trust in that
education), see supra Section IV.B and notes 68-74, may suggest that the
governmental interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit material
online may not be as compelling as assumed. Although protecting children
(from any number of risks, on- and off-line) is of course a compelling societal
interest, protecting them from online content may no longer be a significant
governmental interest.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). Technically, § 230 was enacted as a part of
the CDA. Although the Supreme Court struck down the CDA's indecency
provisions in Reno v. ACLU in 1997, the remainder of that Act (including §
230) was not challenged and remains good law today. By enacting § 230,
Congress sought to advance three important legislative goals: 1) to promote
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ISPs or intermediaries from most civil suits (and some criminal
charges) based on the content created by their users (and others).95
These protections from liability have enabled social networking and
other interactive sites that rely on user-generated content to
flourish. Consequently, these sites are the vibrant platforms for
freewheeling expression at the heart of Web 2.0.
But § 230 had another specific goal, that of promoting user
control technology. As Congress declared: "It is the policy of the
United States ...to encourage the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer service[s] ....""
Among other provisions, § 230 insulates ISPs, websites, and
technology creators from liability for making or offering user
control technology to help users and parents control their Internet
experiences.1
7
Using the term to mean more than just "parental control,"
the Web 2.0 environment represents a new high point for "user
control": Users are now able to shape many different aspects of
their online experience, customizing websites and services to meet
their exact interests. Facebook, Pandora, and myriad other
interactive services enable highly granular degrees of control over
what content a user will see or hear. And because many Web 2.0
the continued rapid and innovative development of the Internet (and other
interactive media); 2) to remove disincentives to voluntary self-screening of
content by service providers; and 3) to promote the development of user
control technologies. For an analysis of the legislative history and intent
behind § 230, see Brief for Anti-Spyware Coalition, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee, Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 569 F.3d 1169 (9th
Cir. 2009) (No. 07-35800) at 4-15, available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spy
ware/20080505amicus.pdf.
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). If ISPs, web hosts, and websites were
instead made potentially liable for content posted by others, they would be
forced to assume content gatekeeper roles and would be more reluctant to
host controversial (though lawful) speech. Without § 230, entry barriers for
new Internet services and applications would be much higher, dampening the
innovation we have witnessed heretofore in interactive media.
96. Id. § 230(b)(3).
97. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A)-(B).
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applications rely on user-generated content-and, therefore, active,
engaged users-such applications are all the more responsive to
user input and demands for user empowerment tools than their
Web 1.0 predecessors. As one example of these new levels of user
control, the experience of listening to music today is quite different
from the way it was thirty years ago, when FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation98 was decided. Today, instead of being subjected to
whatever songs or other content a radio station chooses to
broadcast, you can now use sites such as Pandora.com to assemble a
stream of music precisely to your tastes. To go a step further, you
can take your own library of music with you using MP3 players.
In turn, the innovation in interactive media has spurred
innovation in more traditional parental and user control tools.
User controls remain key for helping parents protect children in the
Web 2.0 world. Filters can block in their entirety social networking
sites such as MySpace or Facebook that may not be appropriate for
children under thirteen. To aid parents of older minors, the market
is responding with tools that allow parents to monitor a range of
online activities, including children's use of social networks, and to
facilitate discussion and guidance around a range of online safety
concerns that go beyond mere accessibility of sexually explicit
content. 99 Some of the leading social networks are themselves
providing parental control tools and taking other steps to promote
online child safety.'0 0
98. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
99. See, e.g., OnlineFamily.Norton, https://onlinefamily.norton.com/
familysafety/loginStart.fs (marketing a set of tools for parents to use to
monitor and control their children's Internet usage). These tools aim to help
parents not only monitor online activity, but also to foster dialogue between
parents and children about a range of online safety concerns. See also Press
Release, Symantec, Symantec Launches New, Unique OnlineFamily.Norton
Service for Free Through 2009 (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.symantec.com/
about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20090427_01 (addressing "online
predators and cyberbullies").
100. See INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, THE BERKMAN
CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY & ONLINE
TECHNOLOGIES 24-26, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/
cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/ISTfFFinal-Report.pdf (Dec. 31, 2008)
(summarizing child safety actions and services of social networks).
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In addition, as content migrates beyond personal computers
onto a variety of mobile and wireless devices, the industry has
worked to keep pace by meeting the demand for parental controls
of such devices.01 Parents now have multiple options to help
control content their children can access on cell phones and other
wireless devices.' °2 The range and diversity of user control tools
makes plain the power of the market to respond quickly to rapidly
changing platforms.
On top of the increasing number and diversity of content
and service offerings on the Internet is the increasing globalization
of online content. The number of non-U.S. Internet users has
grown rapidly over the past decade,0 3 and these users have fully
embraced the interactive nature of Web 2.0. In response,
blogging platforms, social networking websites, and other user-
generated content sites increasingly offer localized versions of their
services to cater to users from all over the world.' °5 These and
other factors have resulted in a significant increase of web content
hosted and originating outside of the United States, and a shift
away from English as the dominant online language.'0 6
101. See THIERER, supra note 49, at 103-12 (providing an updated survey
of parental control tools that have developed for mobile devices).
102. Id.
103. See Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Statistics: World Internet
Users and Population Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2009).
104. See Social Networking's New Global Footprint, NIELSON WIRE, Mar.
9, 2009, http://blog.nielson.com/nielsonwire/global/social-networking-new-
global-footprint.
105. For example, YouTube, Facebook, Blogger, and Wikipedia all offer
localized or local language versions of their platforms. See, e.g., Blogger
Language Selection, https://www.blogger.com/language.g (last visited Oct. 12,
2009) (allowing customized language settings for Blogger); Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (displaying a list of
available language versions on the bottom of the homepage); YouTube India,
http://www.youtube.com/index?gl=IN (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (offering
localized content); Wolna Encyklopeida, http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strona-g
%C5%82%C3%B3wna (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (Wikipedia Poland).
106. See generally Daniel Sorid, "Writing the Web's Future in Numerous
Languages," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at B1 (highlighting the creation of
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Collectively, this global body of users is creating vast amounts of
diverse content, with over twenty hours of video uploaded every
minute by a worldwide user base to YouTube alone.'0 7
The volume and diversity of content-and the great global
diversity of societal perspectives about what content is appropriate,
and what content can be regulated-suggest that it is highly
unlikely that there will ever be global consensus on content
regulation, or that a one-size-fits-all speech restriction could ever
address the diversity of speech represented in such a fast-paced
global environment. These trends only strengthen Berman and
Weitzner's argument that voluntary, client-side user empowerment
tools-which can be tailored to each country, culture, and even
household-are the most effective way to protect users and minors
from unwanted content without chilling speech.
VI.CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]echnology expands
the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution
if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these
choices for us.'108 As technology progresses, user empowerment
tools have become increasingly ubiquitous across a broad range of
platforms. Without a doubt, it is becoming clear that a robust
market for user empowerment tools can adjust to rapid changes in
technology far more effectively than legislation passed by Congress.
Indeed, user control tools are also seeping back up the
technological spectrum. There is now a diversity of tools available
to help parents control what their children can view over broadcast
television, and these tools are undercutting the validity of the case
that Jerry Berman and Daniel Weitzner were originally seeking to
applications and services that allow users to create and read content in South
Asian languages).
107. Posting of Ryan Junee to Broadcasting Ourselves ;): The Official
YouTube Blog, http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2009/05/zoinks-20-hours-
of-video-uploaded-every_20.html (May 20, 2009).
108. U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803. 818 (2000).
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ward off-FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.109 As the Second Circuit
observed about Pacifica in a broadcast indecency case,
"technological advances may obviate the constitutional legitimacy
of the FCC's robust oversight" under Pacifica.11° And certainly as
media (including content from broadcast networks) converge into
the Internet realm, the strong user control tools available online
will provide effective "less restrictive alternatives" to government
censorship.
Berman and Weitzner concluded their 1995 analysis with a
"hope that Congress and the courts will recognize the unique
nature of interactive media and choose to regulate them
accordingly," and with an exhortation for industry "to move
forward with the task of building open networks that maximize
abundance, diversity, and user control." '111 Looking back, we can
see that both the courts and industry have moved in the right
direction: by placing empowerment tools in users' hands so they can
shape their online experience, we collectively have built a solid
foundation for an open and uncensored Internet.
109. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
110. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 466 (2d Cir.
2007).
111. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 1, at 1637.
2009]
